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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
son County Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion where the evi-
dence tended to show that the defendant's brother-in-law was sharing the
transportation costs."
JUSTIN C. SMITH
TRADE REGULATION
OHIo FAIR TRADE LAw
The Ohio 1959 Fair Trade Law' was analyzed in the Trade Regula-
tion article in the 1960 Survey of Ohio Law.2 Up to that time the only
reported cases decided under the 1959 statute were in the Common Pleas
Courts of Cuyahoga and Hamilton Counties. These decisions were uni-
formly against the validity of Ohio's second Fair Trade Law.?
The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas decisions were appealed, and
the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the 1959 statute
is constitutional as applied to non-contracting parties.4 It should be re-
called that the Ohio law5 declares it to be unlawful and an act of unfair
competition for any distributor, with notice that a proprietor has estab-
lished a stipulated minimum sale price for a trademark or trade name
commodity at his level of distribution, to sell, offer to sell, or advertise
such a commodity for sale at a price lower than the stipulated minimum
resale price.
The majority opinion in the court of appeals case reviewed the history
of Fair Trade legislation in the United States and noted the widespread
acceptance of its validity in other states. It pointed to the studious at-
tempt of the Ohio legislature to avoid the objections which resulted in the
unconstitutionality of the first Fair Trade Act of 1936 and recognized
that the control of resale prices is within the scope of legislative authority
and that "price cutting" of the trade-marked or trade named commodities
is contrary to the common good. The court concluded that the 1959
act is constitutional, violating no constitutional rights of plaintiffs-price
cutters. The dissenting opinion concluded that the Ohio Supreme
Court decision of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation v. Bargain Fair,
Incorporated,6 was controlling on the court of appeals in these cases. That
case had held that the Fair Trade Act of 1936 was an unauthorized exer-
cise of the police power, violated the due process provision of the Ohio
53. This case also presented the interesting question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor can be applied where the facts disclosed that the plaintiff was asleep in the back seat
of the car at the time of the accident. In denying the latter contention the court relied on
Hocking Valley R.R. v. Wykel, 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N.E. 860 (1930), where the supreme
court defined the duty of a passenger as follows: "One riding as a guest in an automobile does
not assume the responsibilities of the driver .... He is required to exercise that care for his
own safety which persons of ordinary care and prudence are accustomed to exercise under the
same or similar circumstances ......
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Bill of Rights, and delegated legislative power and discretion to private
persons.
Counsel have advised that last year's court of appeals decision has
been appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Further comment on the
situation of the nonsigner in Ohio should await the decision of the
supreme court.
TRADE NAMES AND SERVICE MARKS
An interesting common pleas court decision adjudicated the right of
a party to obtain the exclusive use of the word "Securance" as a trade
name and service mark.' The controversy developed after a national in-
surance company and its affiliated companies began an advertising cam-
paign in 1960 to promote the word "Securance" as a service mark, that
is, a trade mark for services. Plaintiff shortly thereafter made application
for the registration of "Securance" as a trade name and service mark
under the Ohio statutes! From the evidence presented at the trial it
appeared that the plaintiff had consistently used the name since 1955,
but only in connection with a corporate designation of Securance Service
Inc. Moreover, the word "Securance" had been prominently used by
them in advertising in only two instances.
The plaintiff was seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants
from using "Securance" as a service mark. The court held that since
service marks are described as trade marks for services, and ownership
of a mark cannot be acquired without its being substantially used, the
plaintiff was unable to carry the burden of proof of its being so used.
Therefore, an injunction was denied. Defendants had filed a cross peti-
tion praying the cancellation of plaintiff's registration of the service mark
"Securance." Since there was no proof of substantial exclusive and con-
tinuous use of a mark by the plaintiff for at least five years prior to the
date of the filing of the application for registration as required by statute,'
the court declared the plaintiff's service mark registration of "Securance"
invalid and ordered the Secretary of State to cancel the registration from
his records.
MAURICE S. CULP
1. OaIo REv. CODE § 1333.27.
2. Culp, Survey of Ohio Law - Trade Regulation, 12 WEST. RES. L. REV. 578 (1961).
3. Id. at 581. During 1961 another common pleas decision held the 1959 act "unconstitu-
tional as delegating legislative power to private persons." Bulova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store
of Columbus, 176 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
4. Hudson Distribs. Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 176 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
5. OmIo REv. CODE § 1333.32(A).
6. 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.2d 481 (1958).
7. Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 176 NE.2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1961). See also
discussion in Equity section, p. 479 supra.
8. OHio REv. CODE §§ 1329.01-.68.
9. OHro REV. CODE § 1329.55(E) (3).
1962]
